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ABSTRACT 
 
The historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was implemented on 
January 16, 2016 between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3.  The JCPOA 
hopes to ensure that the nuclear program in Iran will exist solely for peaceful purposes.  
This agreement will end long-lasting and crippling sanctions enforced on Iran in exchange 
for inflexible reductions to the Iranian centrifuge enrichment program and assurances of 
the absence of efforts to develop, build, or acquire a nuclear weapon.  Given Iran’s past 
actions of nuclear hedging and pushing the boundaries of agreements, policymakers would 
benefit from a reliable method to judge the effectiveness of this agreement and how it 
should influence future policy.  One method that can help inform policy decisions is with 
estimates of a state’s Nuclear Weapon Latency.  Nuclear Weapons Latency is defined as 
the time needed for a non-nuclear weapon state to develop a conventionally deliverable 
nuclear weapon.   
Iran’s Nuclear Weapon Latency was quantified with and without the JCPOA using 
the Nuclear Weapons Latency Computational Tool developed by D. Sweeney and W. 
Charlton at Texas A&M University.  This MATLAB-based software focuses on the use 
of time-dependent proliferation pathway modeling using Petri Nets.  The proliferation 
pathways used in this analysis include mining, milling, conversion, enrichment (gas 
centrifuge and atomic vapor laser isotope separation), reactor repair or construction, fuel 
fabrication, plutonium production, PUREX reprocessing, development of delivery 
systems, and weapon systems.  A reference time was developed for each transition within 
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the pathway using the reported capacity or production of a facility when known or using 
the Pakistani nuclear program as a historic model if the characteristics for the Iranian 
facility are not known.  The Petri Nets simulation provides an estimate of the distribution 
of likely time durations of a nuclear program until the first deliverable weapon is produced.  
The simulation can be analyzed to test for sensitivities due to the pathways and input 
parameters.  This testing could be valuable in the development of policy and the 
identification of the key technologies that could most impact Iran’s Nuclear Weapons 
Latency.  The analysis performed here shows that the large reduction in the stockpile of 
nuclear material and enrichment capability caused a sizable increase in the Iranian Nuclear 
Weapons Latency.   
 iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my children, Wesley and Virginia Johansen, without 
whom I would have never found the courage to begin this journey. 
 
 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. William Charlton, for his insight, 
time, and expert guidance throughout this process, and my committee members, Dr. 
Tsvetkov and Dr. Fuhrmann, for their support throughout my time at Texas A&M.  I would 
especially like to thank Dr. David Sweeney for his time, understanding, and the use of his 
Nuclear Weapons Latency Tool, which is the basis for this work.   I would also like to 
thank Dr. Sunil Chirayath for his expertise, knowledge, and time.   
 vi 
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NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
PUREX Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction 
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SNM Special Nuclear Material 
SWU Separative Work Unit  
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TRR Tehran Research Reactor 
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WGPu Weapon-Grade Plutonium 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
 
The historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was 
implemented on January 16, 2016, between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 
(China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy) hopes to ensure that the nuclear program in Iran will exist solely for 
peaceful purposes.[1]  This agreement will end long-lasting and crippling sanctions 
enforced on Iran in exchange for inflexible reductions to the Iranian centrifuge enrichment 
program; assurances of the absence of effort to develop, build, or acquire a nuclear 
weapon; the ratification of Additional Protocols; as well as other actions which must be 
taken by Iran and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2]  After 
the ratification of Additional Protocols, the IAEA will be granted the ability to conduct 
additional safeguarding measures within the state and obtain complete knowledge of the 
facilities within Iran which are related to the nuclear fuel cycle, including those with non-
nuclear materials.[3]  These additional measures include the ability to conduct wide area 
sampling to look for undeclared activity and the issuance of multi-entry visas for 
inspectors.  These new inspection practices could help to build trust and verify the current 
activities within Iran. 
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This agreement marks an important change in the tone of the diplomatic relations 
with Iran.  The ratcheting down of the relations between the United States and Iran may 
allow for a more productive dialogue, not only between the United States and Iran, but 
also with Iran’s neighbors which have felt alienated and threatened by the possibility of a 
nuclear Iran.  This might have the effect of slowing proliferation in the region.[4] 
Others in the international community argue however that since signing the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 and agreeing not to develop 
nuclear weapons, the Iranians have continually pushed the boundaries and, in fact, acted 
in a way which is in opposition to the treaty; never truly acting in good faith.[5]   
This work will examine Iran’s proliferation pathways and determine the impact of 
the JCPOA will have on the amount of time expected for Iran to produce a conventionally 
deliverable nuclear weapon if it chose to do so (which we refer to as the Nuclear Weapons 
Latency).  It is generally agreed that the longer it takes for a state to proliferate, the less 
likely they are to do so and the less threatening they are to their neighbors.  Thus, we 
expect the Nuclear Weapons Latency to provide a strong indicator of the proliferation 
potential for a state and of the destabilizing potential for a state proliferation program.  For 
the Iranian program, we expect that the JCPOA will increase the Nuclear Weapons 
Latency, but in this work, we will quantify that impact under both covert and breakout 
scenarios. 
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1.2 Nuclear Weapons Programs 
 
Nuclear weapons programs involve the acquisition of Special Nuclear Material 
(SNM), the design and fabrication of the nuclear explosive, and the development of a 
suitable delivery system.  SNM primarily consists of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and 
plutonium (containing less than 80% 238Pu).  HEU is uranium enriched to greater than 
20% by mass in the isotope 235U.  SNM does not occur in nature and must be produced 
using highly specialized facilities.  A nuclear weapons program typically uses materials 
of a higher quality, sometimes referred to as weapons-grade.  There is not a specific 
technical definition for weapons-grade materials, but weapons-grade uranium (WGU) 
typically is uranium with an enrichment of around 90% in the isotope 235U.  Weapons-
grade plutonium (WGPu) is plutonium with a quantity of 240Pu of around 6%.  A 
significant amount of effort is used to generate these materials and this often can be the 
lengthiest portion of the program.  However, it can be important to consider the 
weaponization activities and delivery system activities as well when fully characterizing 
a nuclear weapons program.[6] 
 
1.3 Nuclear Weapons Latency Tool 
 
The time needed for a non-nuclear weapon state to develop a conventionally 
deliverable nuclear weapon is referred to as the Nuclear Weapons Latency.  An accurate 
assessment of this time is a critical piece of information for policymakers.  The software 
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used for this quantitative measurement was developed by D. Sweeney and W. Charlton at 
Texas A&M University[7] and makes three basic assumptions: 
1. The decision to proliferate has been made 
2. The times to complete individual tasks are able to be estimated 
3. The pathways to a weapon are known 
This software focuses on the use of time-dependent proliferation pathways to simulate a 
state’s proliferation using Petri Nets.[7]  Petri Nets are used to model complicated systems 
using transitions (symbolized with rectangles) and places (symbolized with circles). 
Transitions describe an action that is being undertaken.  Places denote work that has been 
done and show your location along a proliferation pathway.  Places connect to transitions 
and vice versa using directional arcs.  Tokens or markers within places denote your 
location along the path.  When the correct number of tokens are within a place, the 
transition is enabled.  The transition will fire, and after a certain amount of time has passed 
the tokens are sent downstream to the next place.  The time-dependent Petri Nets used in 
this simulation are stochastically timed using a user defined probability density function 
that is randomly sampled each time the transition is enabled.  The number of tokens needed 
for a particular transition to fire and the number of tokens disseminated to the places 
immediately downstream is a function of the arcs connecting the place to the transition 
and from the transition to the following place, or places.   
The Nuclear Weapons Latency Tool uses the MATLAB programing language to 
analyze the time-dependent Petri Nets to arrive at an estimate of a state’s Nuclear Weapon 
Latency time.[8]  Petri Nets are built using Microsoft Visio and the matrices required as 
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inputs are created using a macro within the Visio program.  The entire network of paths 
which lead to proliferation are available to be analyzed by the tool; however, preferred 
paths can be established by the user. These preferred paths are used to test sensitivities 
within the network and identify pivotal paths.  Identifying these key pathways could be 
important information used by policy makers when assessing their interactions with a 
state.  
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2. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR COMPLEX 
 
To determine the proliferation capacity of Iran, the speed with which material 
moves through the system, and in order to build the proliferation pathways needed to 
utilize the Nuclear Weapons Latency Tool, the operating fuel cycle facilities, stockpiles 
of SNM, and research and development (R&D) facilities in Iran were studied and 
quantified.  This examination was conducted using documents and reports resulting from 
inspections of Iran by the IAEA, satellite imagery, and declarations made by Iran, both 
historically and contemporarily.  The results of this examination were used to determine 
the transition timing for the movement of material through the system. 
The Iranian nuclear complex includes mining, milling, and conversion of natural 
uranium for (1) production of natural uranium fuel for the IR-40 heavy-water reactor under 
construction at Arak or (2) enrichment at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant to 3.67% 
enriched uranium hexafluoride.  This 3.67% enriched material would then be (a) converted 
into power reactor fuel for a nuclear power plant or (b) continued to be enriched to either 
19.75% for research reactor fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) or to greater than 
70% for weapons manufacturing.  Iran also possesses a number of R&D facilities.  Each 
of the facilities in the Iranian nuclear complex is discussed below including quantification 
of the capacity of those facilities.   
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2.1 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities  
 
 The types of nuclear activities that were included in this analysis included uranium 
mining, milling, enrichment [specifically gaseous centrifuge enrichment and atomic vapor 
laser isotope separation (AVLIS)] nuclear reactors (building facilities, fuel irradiation, and 
fuel storage before reprocessing), fuel fabrication [natural uranium fuel, low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel, and production of cladding], and Plutonium Uranium Redox 
Extraction (PUREX).   
 
2.1.1 Uranium Mines 
 
 The major uranium mining facilities in Iran are the Saghand and Gachin mines.  
The Gachin mine is an open-pit mine which produces approximately 21 tons of uranium 
per year and has an ore grade of 0.05%.  The Saghand mine is an underground mine which 
produces approximately 50 tons of uranium per year and has an ore grade of 0.20%.[9-11]  
Uranium ore grades vary by geographic location, but generally the content of uranium 
near uranium mines ranges from 0.03% to 24%.[12]  The low quantity of the uranium ore 
found in this region is a major obstacle for Iran’s nuclear program.   
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2.1.2 Uranium Milling Facilities 
 
 The two major uranium milling facilities at Ardakan and Gachin are responsible 
for taking the uranium ore from the mines and converting it into yellowcake, U3O8.  The 
larger of the two mills, Ardakan, processes approximately 50 tons of uranium per year, 
matching the capacity of the Saghand mine.  The second mill, Gachin, matches the output 
of the Gachin mine, approximately 21 tons of uranium per year.[13]   
 
2.1.3 Uranium Conversion Facilities 
 
 There is one main conversion facility in Iran, the Esfahan Uranium Conversion 
Facility (UCF).  This facility converts the yellowcake, or U3O8, into uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6) gas to be used in the gas centrifuge enrichment facilities and into uranium dioxide 
(UO2) and natural uranium metal for use as reactor fuel.
[14]  UCF produces approximately 
140 tons of UF6 per year.     
 
2.1.4 Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities 
 
2.1.4.1 Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Prior to JCPOA 
 
 While the Iranians have experimented with several advanced centrifuges, their 
current enrichment program utilizes two types of gas centrifuges: the IR-1 and the IR-
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2m.[15]  Each IR-1 centrifuge has a separative capacity of 0.9 SWU (Separative Work Unit) 
per year.  The more advanced, but unreliable, IR-2m centrifuge has a separation factor of 
between 3 and 5 SWU per year.   
The largest gas centrifuge enrichment facility in Iran is the Natanz Fuel 
Enrichment Plant (NFEP).  It contains 9,494 active IR-1 centrifuges and 6,250 IR-1 
centrifuges which are idle but available to enrich.[15, 16]  Also located at the NFEP are 1,008 
active IR-2m centrifuges and an additional 2,088 IR-2m centrifuges which are in the 
process of being installed.[17, 18]  The NFEP produces 3.67% enriched uranium 
hexafluoride product.  Overall, the NFEP has an active capacity of 11,568-13,584 SWU 
per year with an additional 11,889-16,050 SWU per year idle. 
The Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (NPFEP) uses 328 IR-1 centrifuges to 
produce 19.75% enriched uranium, presumably for the TRR, using 3.67% enriched 
uranium feed from the NFEP.  Thus, the NPFEP has a total capacity of 295 SWU per year. 
The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) is also an IR-1 facility.  It contains 696 
active gaseous centrifuges and 2,014 centrifuges which are idle but available to enrich.[19]  
Thus, the FFEP has an active capacity of 626 SWU per year with an additional 1812 SWU 
per year idle.  The FFEP uses 3.67% enriched uranium feed to produce 19.75% enriched 
uranium product.  It was also suspected that the FFEP had originally been designed to 
produce WGU at or near 90% enriched. 
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2.1.4.2 Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Post-JCPOA 
 
 The reduction of installed centrifuges under the JCPOA is impactful.  After the 
implementation of the JCPOA, the number of IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz facility will 
be reduced from 15,744 to 5,060.   Additionally, the IR-2m centrifuges, superfluous IR-1 
centrifuges, and replacement parts will be stored under constant monitoring by the 
IAEA.[1]  This reduces the Iranian gaseous centrifuge capacity by over 80% to 4,554 SWU 
per year. 
 
2.1.5 AVLIS 
 
 From the 1970’s until 2003, Iran conducted research into AVLIS at a secret site 
known as Lashkar Ab’ad.[20]  The facility, before dismantling, would have been capable 
of producing 5 kg of 3.5%-7% enrichment by the end of the first year, and if fully 
implemented might have been capable of producing minute quantities of HEU.[21, 22]  
AVLIS has many advantages to a centrifuge facility which make it ideal as a covert facility 
under the JCPOA.  These advantages include having a small footprint and a small heat 
signature.  Additionally, this past work has provided experience into the AVLIS process.     
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2.1.6 Nuclear Reactors 
 
2.1.6.1 Arak IR-40 Heavy-Water Research Reactor 
 
 The IR-40 is a 40 MW Heavy-Water Research Reactor (HWRR) which is still 
under construction.  Iran has reported that this facility is 68% complete.  This reactor is of 
particular concern because when functioning optimally it would be capable of producing 
9 kg of WGPu annually.[23, 24]  The JCPOA calls for the Arak reactor to be redesigned to 
operate using fuel enriched to 3.67%, and without producing WGPu.  The calandria tank 
will be removed from the reactor and rendered inoperable by filling it with concrete.  
Additionally, all spent fuel will be shipped out of Iran for the life of the reactor.[1]   
 
2.1.6.2 Bushehr Pressurized Water Reactor 
 
 The Bushehr Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) is a 1000 MWe reactor.  Russia 
supplies the fuel for this reactor and is responsible for the removal of spent fuel when it is 
safe for transport.[25, 26]  This facility has been bombed, suffered delays because of pump 
damage, and is built on a fault line.  However, even due to all of these issues, the reactor 
is a fairly typical power reactor and is generally considered to not be a proliferation 
concern. 
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2.1.6.3 Tehran Research Reactor 
  
 The TRR is a 5 MWth Light-Water Reactor (LWR).  This reactor, along with its 
HEU fuel, was originally supplied to Iran by the United States.[27]  In 1987, Argentina 
adapted the reactor to utilize fuel enriched to only just under 20% and sold 161 kg of fuel 
to Iran.[28]  The JCPOA calls for Iran to utilize all the uranium oxide which is enriched 
between 5% and 20% to fabricate fuel plates for the TRR and for all spent fuel to be 
removed from Iran.[1]   
 
2.1.7 Fuel Fabrication 
 
 The fuel fabrication facilities within Iran are limited to the Fuel Fabrication 
Laboratory (FFL), the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP), and the Zirconium Production 
Plant (ZPP) located near Esfahan.[29]  The IAEA reported in 2004 that the FFL has only a 
limited fuel pellet production capability.[30]  The FPFP produces the natural uranium fuel 
for the IR-40 HWRR and is capable of producing the fuel for the Bushehr PWR, but the 
JCPOA mandates that this fuel be supplied by and then returned to Russia after 
irradiation.[31]  ZPP produces the cladding used to encase the fuel.  The cladding helps to 
contain the fission products produced within the fuel during irradiation and ensures they 
do not leak into the environment.  ZPP, when completed, will be able to produce 10 tons 
of zirconium tubing per year for nuclear fuel cladding.  The operational status of this 
facility is unclear.[32]  
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2.1.8 Reprocessing Facilities 
 
 Reprocessing refers to the extraction of actinides of interest, generally uranium 
and plutonium, from spent fuel.  There is no evidence to suggest that Iran operates any 
reprocessing facilities large enough to be capable of reprocessing spent fuel.[23]  Only 
small, research-like facilities (hot cells) are known to exist in both the Arak Nuclear 
Complex and the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC).  A large facility would be 
needed to produce enough WGPu for a weapon.  However, the JCPOA expressly forbids 
even the R&D of reprocessing techniques as well as the import of the equipment needed.   
 The typical spent fuel reprocessing method used today is some variant of the 
PUREX process.  The PUREX process has been in use since the 1950’s and has many 
proliferation concerns.  The process begins with the chopping of the spent fuel.  The 
chopped fuel is then dissolved in nitric acid, separating the cladding from the fuel.[33]  The 
dissolved fuel, which contains the uranium and plutonium, enters into a solvent extraction 
process. The end result is uranium (potentially in the form of UO2 or even UF6, which is 
suitable for gaseous enrichment), and PuO2, which can be converted into plutonium metal 
for an implosion weapon.  The footprint of a PUREX facility is large and the equipment 
needed is specialized and tightly controlled.  Equipment such as hot cells, remote 
manipulators, and large glove boxes are not allowed under the JCPOA.[1]   
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2.1.9 Heavy-Water Production Facilities 
 
 Heavy water is water which contains deuterium (an isotope of hydrogen whose 
nucleus is comprised of both a neutron and a proton).  Heavy water has a much smaller 
neutron absorption cross-section than ordinary light water, which allows it to be used as a 
moderator in natural-uranium fueled reactors.  Because of the proliferation concerns 
surrounding natural-uranium fueled reactors, the JCPOA puts strict controls and limits on 
the amount of heavy water that can be produced at the heavy-water production plant near 
Khondab.[1]  The JCPOA limits the Iranian heavy-water inventory and production to 130 
metric tons of nuclear-grade heavy water prior to the commissioning of the Arak Research 
Reactor, and 90 metric tons afterward.   
 
2.2 SNM Stockpiles 
 
 Based on data in the August 2013 IAEA Safeguards Report, the Iranian stockpile 
consisted of 6,774 kg of 3.5% enriched UF6, 186 kg of near 20% enriched UF6, and about 
130 kg of near 20% enriched UO2.
[15, 17, 18]  After the implementation of the JCPOA, Iran 
is required to reduce this stockpile to a maximum of 300 kg of UF6 enriched to no more 
than 3.67%.[1]   
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2.3 Research and Development Facilities 
 
 Iran has several R&D facilities studying nuclear weapons development.  These 
facilities include: 
 Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories 
 Parchin Military Complex 
 Physics Research Center 
 TNRC 
 Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces and Logistics 
 
The research conducted in these facilities is thought to include missile technology, gun-
type weapon design, and implosion weapon technology and design.[28, 34-39] 
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3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS LATENCY MODEL FOR IRAN 
 
Using the known Iranian nuclear capabilities and the Nuclear Weapons Latency 
Tool, a set of models were constructed to assess Iranian Nuclear Weapons Latency both 
without and with the JCPOA in force.  In this chapter, the model used for these calculations 
is described.   
 
3.1 Transition Times 
 
 A historical model was used to accurately estimate the time needed to complete 
each transition (for those not currently occurring in Iran).  A set of characteristics were 
considered in order to choose an appropriate historical model for Iran.  The state should 
(a) not be a nuclear weapon state under the NPT, (b) possess nuclear weapons (at this time 
or historically), (c) possess reprocessing capabilities, and (d) be statistically similar to Iran 
[in terms of population, land area, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)].  States that meet 
the requirements (a), (b), and (c) include:  
 Israel 
 Pakistan 
 India 
 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
The statistical data for each of these states was collected and compared to determine the 
most appropriate historical model for Iran.  The results from the statistical comparison for 
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each of these states can be seen in Table 1.  Israel and the DPRK are clearly much smaller 
states than Iran in terms of all of the statistics considered.  In contrast, India is clearly a 
much larger state than Iran in terms of the statistics considered.  Pakistan appears to be the 
most suitable historical model based on its relative similarity in land area and GDP and 
somewhat similar populations.   
 
Table 1: Comparison of Israel, India, Pakistan, and DPRK to Iran to Determine 
Their Suitability as Historic Models.  
 
Country Population Land Area GDP 
 Population 
(million) 
Percent 
difference 
from Iran 
Area 
(mi2) 
Percent 
difference 
from Iran 
GDP 
(trillion) 
Percent 
Difference 
from Iran 
Iran  78 n/a 636,372  n/a 1.015 n/a 
Israel  8 -90% 8,019 -99% 0.28 -72% 
India  1,276 1536% 1,269,346 99% 8.03 691% 
Pakistan  199 155% 340,509 -46% 0.93 -8% 
DPRK  25 -68% 46,528 -93% 0.40 -61% 
 
 
3.2 Building of Proliferation Pathways 
 
 Proliferation pathways were constructed using Microsoft Visio to illustrate the 
movement of material and advancement of capabilities pertinent to proliferation.  These 
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pathways were constructed to reflect as accurately as possible the Iranian nuclear program 
as described in Section 2.   
 
3.2.1 Types of Pathways 
 
Pathways can be classified as either material or facility paths based on the actions 
conducted on that path.  Facility paths are associated with the building of a facility, or 
technological advancements, such as the constructing of a reactor or AVLIS facility.  
Figure 1 shows the facility pathways which represents the construction and operation of a 
reprocessing facility, there are two possible materials that could result from these paths, 
UO2 and PuO2.  Tokens within places on facility paths represent a constructed facility or 
success in a technological advancement.    
Material paths involve the changing of the physical, elemental, or isotopic form of 
a material (such as enrichment or mining).  Figure 2 shows a simplified material pathway 
beginning with mining and branching off to show the abridged paths to a weapon.  Tokens 
on uranium pathways represent 1 kg of 235U, and tokens representing possession of 
plutonium represent approximately 4.5 kg of plutonium, half of the Pu produced annually 
from the Arak reactor.   
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Figure 1: Excerpt from Simplified Facility Pathway Showing the Building and Use 
of a Reprocessing Facility.  The first place, on the far left, symbolizes the possession 
of spent fuel.  After a token is in this place, it will enable the transition that 
symbolizes the construction of a reprocessing facility.  Once the stochastically 
determined time has elapsed the token will move to show the completion and 
readiness of this facility.  Then the second transition, which symbolizes the 
reprocessing of the fuel, will be enabled and after the allotted time one of the places, 
symbolizing the products of reprocessing, will gain a token.  
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Figure 2: Simplified Material Pathway Showing the Flow of Nuclear Material from 
Mining to Weaponization.  This material pathway begins at the bottom of the 
figure with the mining and milling of uranium.  After the conversion the uranium 
can either go to the enrichment facility or to a fuel fabrication facility to produce 
fuel for a HWR.  If the uranium follows the enrichment path it can either end in 
Weaponization (gun-type or HEU implosion) or fuel for a reactor.  If the uranium 
went to fuel for a HWR after conversion the material pathway will continue 
through reprocessing and a plutonium implosion-type weapon. 
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3.2.2 Specific Characteristics of Iranian Pathways Model 
  
 While much is available in the open literature about the Iranian nuclear program, 
we do not have complete information about all aspects of the facilities.  Thus, a number 
of assumptions were made in order to allow for a complete estimation of the Iranian 
Nuclear Weapons Latency.  For facility transition times that were not openly available, 
we used the similar facility in Pakistan as a model.  The facilities for which assumptions 
were made beyond that information available in Chapter 2 are given below.  The known 
SNM stockpiles for Iran were used to place markers simulating the starting place for 
proliferation. 
 
3.2.2.1 AVLIS 
 
 The full scale AVLIS facility modeled is capable of enriching natural uranium to 
5%.  The effort to enrich material to 5% represents 70% of the required energy to enrich 
to 93%.  The transition timing was modeled using the New Labs facility in Pakistan.[41]  
The New Labs facility is a full scale technical facility, similar to the size and specialization 
of an AVLIS facility. 
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3.2.2.2 Arak IR-40 HWRR and other HWRR’s 
 
 In the model for the IR-40, the completion time of the construction for the IR-40 
HWRR was assumed to be 32% of the time it took Pakistan to construct Karachi Nuclear 
Power Plant (KANUPP) in Pakistan.[41]   KANUPP is a 90 MWe pressurized HWR 
operated by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.  The construction of this reactor 
started on August 1, 1966 and became critical on August 1971.[42]  This reactor will serve 
as a historical model when a HWR is constructed within a proliferation pathway. 
 
3.2.2.3 Reprocessing 
 
 Because of the absence of any such facility in Iran, the modeling of this facility 
will be based on the New Labs in Pakistan.[7, 41] 
 
3.2.2.4 Heavy Water 
 
 When modeled for plutonium production with the JCPOA in force, the 
construction transition time of a heavy-water production facility will make use of the 
historic model of Khushab Chemical Plant-1 (KCP-1) heavy-water production plant in 
Pakistan.[7, 41]  
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3.2.2.5 Delivery Systems 
 
 The Islamic Republic of Iran has numerous programs for the development of 
ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range artillery rockets, and currently possesses the 
largest number of deployed missiles in the Middle East.[43]  The Iranian ballistic missile 
program began in the early 1980’s and currently claims to have developed five liquid-
propellant ballistic missiles and a solid-propellant missile.  The Iranian cruise missile 
program began in 2001, and in 2012 they announced that they had developed fourteen 
different cruise missiles.[44]  When modeling delivery system technology, it will be 
assumed that the conventional delivery system exists, but must be retrofitted to 
accommodate a nuclear component.   
 
3.2.2.6 Weapon Designs and Components 
 
 There are several research sites in Iran that are known to have carried out research 
into components and weapon design.  It was found in the 1990’s that the TNRC 
Laboratories produced polonium-210 (material used in a beryllium-polonium neutron 
initiator) through the irradiation of bismuth targets.[28]  Additionally, The large Parchin 
complex is dedicated to research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, 
and high explosives.[34]  The IAEA determined that the testing facilities that exist at 
Parchin include those that could be used for (a) a test of the spherical symmetry of the 
initiation of the high explosive component of a nuclear warhead, (b) tests to ascertain the 
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symmetry of an imploding hemispherical shell of high explosive, and (c) a test of a 
uranium deuteride neutron initiator.[37]  Because of these activities, when modeling 
weaponization the assumption is made that the production of components (i.e. initiators 
and tampers) and that untested weapon designs have been completed.   
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4. PROLIFERATION PATHWAYS WITHOUT THE JCPOA 
 
 Four pathways were modeled using the known capabilities, facilities, and SNM 
present in Iran.[15]  The assumptions made when constructing these pathways included: 
 
 Facilities are operating at 100% capacity 
 Untested weapon designs existed 
 Arak HWRR is 68% completed 
 
Three different types of weapons were modeled within the simulations:  HEU gun-type 
weapon, HEU implosion-type weapon, and WGPu implosion-type weapon. The 
plutonium pathways included both the reprocessing of spent fuel as well as the illicit 
purchase of WGPu metal.   
 
4.1 Gun-Type Weaponization Pathway 
 
The material pathways necessary for a gun-type weapon include the mining, 
milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways involve the use of 
existing enrichment and conversion facilities, the reconfiguration of the enrichment hall 
to facilitate the production of WGU, R&D of delivery systems, and the testing of gun-type 
weapon designs.  The transitions times used for the entire proliferation pathway can be 
seen in Table 2.   
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Table 2: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Proliferation Pathway 
Outside of the JCPOA.  The days listed are the transition times used as reference 
times for each task.  The days for material pathways (mining, milling, and 
conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass through that stage.  While enrichment 
times are inclusive for the material needed for the gun-type weapon.  The 
construction of the enrichment and metal conversion facilities is 1 day in this case 
because they are existing.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery systems 
and the production of untested weapons designs.   
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin  1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan  1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill  3 
4 Mine Gachin  2 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production Plant  2 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge facility 1 
7 Mine Saghand  1 
8 Operate enrichment facilities  34 
9 Build enrichment facilities (existing facility) 1 
10 Operate WGU enrichment facilities  7 
11 Reconfigure LEU Plants for WGU production  30 
12 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
13 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
14 Retrofit Delivery System for nuclear payload 60 
15 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
16 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
17 Produce U Gun Explosive 180 
18 Design U Gun Explosive (existing weapon design) 1 
19 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
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4.2 HEU Implosion-Type Weaponization Pathway 
 
The material pathways necessary for a HEU implosion-type weapon include the 
mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways involve 
the use of existing enrichment and conversion facilities, reconfiguration of the enrichment 
hall to facilitate the production of WGU, R&D of delivery systems, and the hot and cold 
testing of implosion weapon designs.  The times used for hot and cold tests and test 
preparation are derived from the historical example of the Pakistani nuclear program.[7, 41]  
The transitions times used for the entire proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 3.  
 
4.3 Plutonium Implosion-Type Weaponization Produced with Reprocessing 
Pathway 
 
The material pathways necessary for a plutonium implosion-type weapon include 
the mining, milling, conversion, fuel fabrication, fuel irradiation, and spent fuel 
reprocessing.  The facility pathways involve the completion of the Arak HWRR, R&D of 
delivery systems, and the hot and cold testing of implosion weapon designs.  The times 
used for hot and cold tests, test preparation, completion time of the reactor, and 
construction of reprocessing plant are derived from the historical example of the Pakistani 
nuclear program.[7, 41]  The transitions times used for the entire proliferation pathway can 
be seen in Table 4. 
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Table 3: List of Transition Times Used for the HEU Implosion-Type Weapon 
Proliferation Pathway Outside of the JCPOA. The days listed are the transition 
times used as reference times for each task.  The days for material pathways 
(mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass through that 
stage.  While enrichment times are inclusive for the material needed for the HEU 
implosion-type weapon.  The construction of the enrichment and metal conversion 
facilities is 1 day in this case because they are existing.  This is also the case for the 
testing of delivery systems and the production of untested weapons designs.  The 
time to build the testing facilities and conduct testing were extracted from the 
Pakistani historic model. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Retrofit delivery system for nuclear payload 60 
2 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
3 Possess Deliverable HEU Weapon 1 
4 Produce HEU Imp Explosive 180 
5 Subcritical (cold) Test HEU Design with Nat U 192 
6 Nuclear Test HEU Nuclear Explosive 192 
7 Prepare HEU Subcritical (cold) Testing Facility 4434 
8 Prepare HEU Nuclear Explosive Testing Facility 2202 
9 Design HEU Implosion Weapon (existing weapon design) 1 
10 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
11 Operate 2nd enrichment facilities  33 
12 Operate enrichment facilities  158 
13 Build enrichment facilities (existing facility) 1 
14 Operate WGU facilities  12 
15 Reconfigure LEU Plants for WGU production  30 
16 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
17 Build Uranium Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
18 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
19 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6  1 
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Table 3: Continued 
 
Number Transition Days 
20 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill  3 
21 Mine Gachin  2 
22 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant  2 
23 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge facility 1 
24 Mine Saghand  1 
 
 
Table 4: List of Transition Times Used for the Plutonium Implosion-Type Weapon 
with Reprocessing Proliferation Pathway Outside of the JCPOA.  The days listed 
are the transition times used as reference times for each task.  The days for 
material pathways (mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to 
pass through that stage.  The investigation of fuel needs for reactor is 1 day in this 
case because they are known.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery 
systems and the production of untested weapons designs.  The time required to 
build the reprocessing facility, to complete the HWR, the time required to 
reprocess the fuel, to construct testing facilities, to conduct weapons testing, and to 
produce the heavy water needed for the reactor are taken from the Pakistani 
historic model. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
2 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
3 Possess Deliverable Pu Weapon 1 
4 Produce Pu Imp Explosive 180 
5 Subcritical (cold) Test Pu Design with Nat U 192 
6 Nuclear Test Pu Nuclear Explosive 192 
7 Prepare Pu Subcritical (cold) Testing Facility 4434 
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Table 4: Continued 
 
Number Transition Days 
8 Prepare Pu Nuclear Explosive Testing Facility 2202 
9 Design Pu Implosion Weapon (existing weapon design) 1 
10 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
11 Build Reprocessing Facility 2555 
12 Reprocess at facility 165 
13 Cool Fuel 200 
14 Operate Arak Reactor 365 
15 Produce heavy water for Arak Reactor 365 
16 Complete Arak Reactor 1402 
17 Investigate Needs for Arak reactor completion 30 
18 Operate Nat Metal Conversion Facility 90 
19 Yellowcake covertly converted into UO2 for natural uranium 
fuel 
2 
20 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
21 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6  1 
22 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
23 Mine Gachin  2 
24 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
25 Mine Saghand 1 
26 Possess fuel for Arak heavy-water reactor 1 
27 Operate Esfahan Fuel Fabrication Facility  180 
28 Investigate Fuel Fabrication Facilities and options 1 
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4.4 Plutonium Implosion-Type Weaponization Produced with Illicit Plutonium 
Metal Purchase 
 
There are no material pathways necessary for a plutonium implosion-type weapon 
built with acquired plutonium metal.  The facility pathways involve the hot and cold 
testing of implosion weapon designs, purchase of the plutonium metal, and delivery 
systems.  The times used for hot and cold tests and test preparation are derived from the 
historical example of the Pakistani nuclear program.[7, 41]  The transitions times used for 
the entire proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 5.  
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Table 5: List of Transition Times Used for the Plutonium Implosion-Type Weapon 
with Illicit Plutonium Purchase Proliferation Pathway Outside of the JCPOA. The 
days listed are the transition times used as reference times for each task.  The 
testing of delivery systems and the production of untested weapons designs is 1 day 
in this case because they are known.  The time required to construct testing 
facilities and to conduct weapons testing are taken from the Pakistani historic 
model. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Purchas Pu Metal internationally 365 
2 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
3 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing) 1 
4 Possess Deliverable Pu Weapon 1 
5 Produce Pu Imp Explosive 180 
6 Subcritical (cold) Test Pu Design with 
Natural Uranium 
192 
7 Nuclear Test Pu Nuclear Explosive 192 
8 Prepare Pu Subcritical (cold) Testing 
Facility 
4434 
9 Prepare Pu Nuclear Explosive Testing 
Facility 
2202 
10 Design Pu Implosion Weapon (existing 
design) 
1 
11 Initiate  
Weapons R&D 
1 
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5. PROLIFERATION PATHWAYS WITH THE JCPOA IN PLACE
Nine pathways were modeled using the requirements of the JCPOA as a starting point.  
Requirements of the JCPOA which effect proliferation include: 
 Reduction in centrifuge capacity
 Reduction in SNM stockpile
 Arak HWRR retrofit to use LEU fuel
 Heavy water production strictly limited
 No spent fuel will remain in country
 Reprocessing R&D not permitted
 AVLIS R&D not permitted
Three different types of weapons were modeled within the simulations including: HEU 
gun-type weapon, HEU implosion-type weapon, and WGPu implosion-type weapon.   The 
pathways modeled for gun-type weapons include: 
1. Only allowed enrichment capacity
2. Additional covert enrichment facility
3. New AVLIS program; design and construction of facility modeled within the path
4. Existing AVLIS facility
5. Illicit purchase of 5000 kg of UF6 enriched to 3.5%
6. Illicit purchase of 200 kg of UF6 enriched to 20%
The plutonium pathways included the reprocessing of spent fuel as well as the illicit 
purchase of weapons-grade plutonium metal.  
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    The gun-type weapon requires considerably less skill, knowledge, testing 
and  expertise  then  compared  with  the  requirements  of an  implosion-type  weapon.[45]  
Because of this unidirectional sway, the modeling of the gun-type was always used to  
see the difference made by a specific pathway. 
5.1 Gun-Type Weapon Using Allowed Enrichment Capacity 
The material pathways necessary for a gun-type weapon include the mining, 
milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways involve the 
reconfiguration of the existing enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, R&D 
of delivery systems, and the testing of gun-type weapon designs.  The transitions times 
used for the entire proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 6. 
Table 6: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Weapon Proliferation 
Pathway with Enrichment Allowed by the JCPOA.  The days listed are the 
transition times used as reference times for each task.  The days for material 
pathways (mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass 
through that stage.  While enrichment times are inclusive for the material needed 
for the gun-type weapon.  The construction of the enrichment and metal conversion 
facilities is 1 day in this case because they are existing.  This is also the case for the 
testing of delivery systems and the production of untested weapons designs.   
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6 1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6 1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
4 Mine Gachin 2 
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Table 6: Continued 
Number Transition Days 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge facility 1 
7 Mine Saghand 1 
8 Operate downsized Natanz LEU Enrichment Facility 880 
9 Build downsized Natanz enrichment facility (existing facility) 1 
10 Operate Covert Natanz Centrifuge WGU Plant 242 
11 Reconfigure downsized Natanz LEU Plant for WGU production 30 
12 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
13 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
14 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
15 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
16 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
17 Produce U Gun Explosive 180 
18 Design U Gun Explosive (existing design) 1 
19 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
5.2 Gun-Type Weapon Using Additional Enrichment Capacity 
The material pathways necessary for a gun-type weapon in this pathway include 
the mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways 
involve the reconfiguration of the enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, the 
construction of an additional enrichment facility with approximately 14,000 SWU per 
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year, R&D of delivery systems, and the testing of gun-type weapon designs.  The time to 
build the additional enrichment facility is taken from the Pakistani historical case of 
Kahuta Enrichment Facility.  The transitions times used for the entire proliferation 
pathway can be seen in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Weapon Proliferation 
Pathway with Additional Enrichment Facility.  The days listed are the transition 
times used as reference times for each task.  The days for material pathways 
(mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass through that 
stage.  While enrichment times are inclusive for the material needed for the gun-
type weapon.  The construction of the metal conversion facilities is 1 day in this 
case because it is existing.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery systems 
and the production of untested weapons designs.  The time used in the construction 
of the additional enrichment facility is from the Pakistan historical model of the 
Kahuta Enrichment Facility. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6 1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
4 Mine Gachin 2 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge facility  1 
7 Mine Saghand 1 
8 Operate two LEU plants 213 
9 Build additional enrichment facility  1825 
10 Operate Covert WGU Plant 60 
11 Reconfigure LEU Plant for WGU production 30 
12 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
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Table 7: Continued 
 
Number Transition Days 
13 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing) 1 
14 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
15 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
16 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
17 Produce U Gun Explosive 180 
18 Design U Gun Explosive (existing design) 1 
19 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
 
5.3 Gun-Type Weapon Utilizing a New AVLIS Enrichment Program 
 
The material pathways necessary for a gun-type weapon in this pathway include 
the mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways 
involve the reconfiguration of the enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, the 
design and construction of an AVLIS enrichment facility, R&D of delivery systems, and 
the testing of gun-type weapon designs.  The transitions times used for the entire 
proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 8. 
 
5.4 Gun-Type Weapon Utilizing an Existing AVLIS Enrichment Program 
 
The material pathways necessary for a gun-type weapon in this pathway include 
the mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways 
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involve the reconfiguration of the enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, 
utilization of existing enrichment facilities (centrifuge and AVLIS), R&D of delivery 
systems, and the testing of gun-type weapon designs.  The transitions times used for the 
entire proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 9. 
 
Table 8: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Weapon Proliferation 
Pathway with a New AVLIS Enrichment Facility. The days listed are the transition 
times used as reference times for each task.  The days for material pathways 
(mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass through that 
stage.  While HEU enrichment times are inclusive for the material needed for the 
gun-type weapon.  The construction of the metal conversion facility is 1 day in this 
case because it is existing.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery systems 
and the production of untested weapons designs.  The construction time for the 
AVLIS facility utilizes the Pakistani historical model of the construction of the New 
Labs facility. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6 1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
4 Mine Gachin 2 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge facility 1 
7 Mine Saghand 1 
8 Build pilot AVLIS facility (existing facility) 0 
9 Build full scale AVILS facility 1836 
10 Operate AVLIS LEU plant 30 
11 Build downsized enrichment facility (existing facility)   1 
12 Operate Covert Natanz Centrifuge WGU Plant 126 
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Table 8: Continued 
 
Number Transition Days 
13 Reconfigure downsized Natanz LEU Plant for WGU production 30 
14 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
15 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
16 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
17 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
18 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
19 Produce U Gun Explosive 180 
20 Design U Gun Explosive (existing design) 1 
21 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
 
 
Table 9: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Weapon Proliferation 
Pathway with an Existing AVLIS Enrichment Facility.  The days listed are the 
transition times used as reference times for each task.  The days for material 
pathways (mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass 
through that stage.  While HEU enrichment times are inclusive for the material 
needed for the gun-type weapon.  The construction of the metal conversion facility, 
LEU enrichment facility, and AVLIS facility is 1 day in this case because they are 
existing.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery systems and the production 
of untested weapons designs.   
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6 1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
4 Mine Gachin 2 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
  
 40 
 
Table 9: Continued 
 
Number Transition Days 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge facility 1 
7 Mine Saghand 1 
8 Build pilot AVLIS facility (existing facility) 1 
9 Build full scale AVILS facility (existing facility) 1 
10 Operate AVLIS LEU plant 30 
11 Build downsized enrichment facility (existing) 1 
12 Operate Covert Centrifuge WGU Plant 126 
13 Reconfigure downsized Natanz LEU Plant for WGU production 30 
14 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
15 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
16 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
17 Test Delivery/Missile Systems 180 
18 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
19 Produce U Gun Explosive 180 
20 Design U Gun Explosive (existing design) 60 
21 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
 
 
5.5 Gun-Type Weapon Using an Illicit Purchase of 5000 kg of UF6 Enriched to 
3.5% 
 
The material pathways necessary for gun-type Weaponization includes the mining, 
milling, conversion, enrichment of uranium, and the purchase of 5000 kg of UF6 which is 
enriched to 3.5%.  The facility pathways involve the reconfiguration of the existing 
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enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, R&D of delivery systems, and the 
testing of gun-type weapon designs.  The transitions times used for the entire proliferation 
pathway can be seen in Table 10. 
 
5.6 Gun-Type Weapon Using an Illicit Purchase of 200 kg of UF6 Enriched to 20% 
 
The material pathways necessary for a gun-type weapon in this pathway include 
the mining, milling, conversion, enrichment of uranium, and the purchase of 200 kg of 
UF6 which is enriched to 20%.  The facility pathways involve the reconfiguration of the 
existing enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, R&D of delivery systems, 
and the testing of gun-type weapon designs.  The transitions times used for the entire 
proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 11. 
 
5.7 HEU Implosion-Type Weaponization 
 
The material pathways necessary for a HEU implosion weapon includes the 
mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment of uranium.  The facility pathways involve 
the reconfiguration of the existing enrichment hall to facilitate the production of WGU, 
R&D of delivery systems, and the hot and cold testing of implosion weapon designs.  The 
times used for hot and cold tests and test preparation is derived from the historical example 
of the Pakistani nuclear program.[7, 41]  The transitions times used for the entire 
proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 12. 
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Table 10: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Weapon Proliferation 
Pathway Which Includes the Illicit Purchase of 5000 kg of UF6 Enriched to 3.5%. 
The days listed are the transition times used as reference times for each task.  The 
days for material pathways (mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 
235U to pass through that stage.  While enrichment times are inclusive for the 
material needed for the gun-type weapon.  The construction of the enrichment 
facility and metal conversion facility is 1 day in this case because it is existing.  This 
is also the case for the testing of delivery systems and the production of untested 
weapons designs.  The operation time for the LEU facility is 1 day because the 
enrichment level of the illicit material purchased is greater than this first 
enrichment step.   
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6  1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
4 Mine Gachin 2 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge enrichment 1 
7 Mine Saghand 1 
8 Operate downsized LEU plant 1 
9 Build downsized enrichment facility (existing facility) 1 
10 Operate Centrifuge WGU Plant 340 
11 Reconfigure downsized Natanz LEU Plant for WGU production 30 
12 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
13 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
14 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
15 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
16 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
17 Produce U Gun Explosive 180 
18 Design U Gun Explosive (existing design) 1 
19 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
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Table 11: List of Transition Times Used for the Gun-Type Weapon Proliferation 
Pathway Which Includes the Illicit Purchase of 200 kg of UF6 Enriched to 20%.  
The days listed are the transition times used as reference times for each task.  The 
days for material pathways (mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 
235U to pass through that stage.  While enrichment times are inclusive for the 
material needed for the gun-type weapon.  The construction of the enrichment 
facility and metal conversion facility is 1 day in this case because it is existing.  This 
is also the case for the testing of delivery systems and the production of untested 
weapons designs.  The operation time for the LEU facility is 1 day because the 
enrichment level of the illicit material purchased is greater than this first 
enrichment step. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
2 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6  1 
3 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
4 Mine Gachin 2 
5 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
6 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge enrichment 1 
7 Mine Saghand 1 
8 Operate downsized LEU plant 1 
9 Build downsized enrichment facility (existing) 1 
10 Operate Covert Centrifuge WGU Plant 117 
11 Reconfigure downsized LEU Plant for WGU production  30 
12 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
13 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
14 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
15 Test Delivery/Missile Systems 180 
16 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 1 
17 Produce U Gun Explosive 60 
18 Design U Gun Explosive (existing design) 1 
19 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
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Table 12: List of Transition Times Used for the HEU Implosion-Type Weapon 
Proliferation Pathway.  The days listed are the transition times used as reference 
times for each task.  The days for material pathways (mining, milling, and 
conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass through that stage.  While enrichment 
times are inclusive for the material needed for the HEU implosion-type weapon.  
The construction of the enrichment and metal conversion facilities is 1 day in this 
case because they are existing.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery 
systems and the production of untested weapons designs.  The time to build the 
testing facilities and conduct testing was extracted from the Pakistani historic 
model. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Operate 2nd stage enrichment facilities 135 
2 Operate downsized LEU plant 949 
3 Build downsized enrichment facility (existing facility) 1 
4 Operate Covert Centrifuge WGU Plant 32 
5 Reconfigure downsized LEU Plant for WGU production 30 
6 Operate HEU Metal Conversion Facility 84 
7 Build U Metal Conversion Facility (existing facility) 1 
8 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
9 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
10 Possess Deliverable HEU Weapon 1 
11 Produce HEU Imp Explosive 180 
12 Subcritical (cold) Test HEU Design with Nat U 192 
13 Nuclear Test HEU Nuclear Explosive 192 
14 Prepare HEU Subcritical (cold) Testing Facility 4434 
15 Prepare HEU Nuclear Explosive Testing Facility 2202 
16 Design HEU Implosion Weapon (existing design) 1 
17 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
18 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6  1 
  
 45 
 
Table 12: Continued 
 
Number Transitions Days 
19 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6  1 
20 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
21 Mine Gachin 2 
22 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
23 Convert U3O8 to UF6 for use in centrifuge enrichment 1 
24 Mine Saghand 1 
 
 
5.8 Plutonium Implosion-Type Weaponization Produced Utilizing Reprocessing 
Pathway 
 
The material pathways necessary for a plutonium implosion-type weapon include 
the mining, milling, conversion, fuel fabrication, irradiation of fuel, and spent fuel 
reprocessing.  The facility pathways involve the construction of a HWR, a reprocessing 
facility, heavy-water production plant, R&D of delivery systems, and the hot and cold 
testing of implosion weapon designs.  The times used for hot and cold tests, test 
preparation, construction time of the reactor, and construction of reprocessing plant are 
derived from the historical example of the Pakistani nuclear program.[7, 41]  The transitions 
times used for the entire proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 13. 
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Table 13: List of Transition Times Used for the Pu Implosion-Type Weapon 
Reprocessing Proliferation Pathway with JCPOA in Force.  The days listed are the 
transition times used as reference times for each task.  The days for material 
pathways (mining, milling, and conversion) are times for 1 kg of 235U to pass 
through that stage.  The investigation of fuel needs for reactor is 1 day in this case 
because they are known.  This is also the case for the testing of delivery systems and 
the production of untested weapons designs.  The time required to build the 
reprocessing facility, the time to build the HWR, the time required to reprocess the 
fuel, to construct testing facilities, to conduct weapons testing, and to produce the 
heavy water needed for the reactor are taken from the Pakistani historic model. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
2 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing technology) 1 
3 Possess Deliverable Pu Weapon 1 
4 Produce Pu Imp Explosive 180 
5 Subcritical (cold) Test Pu Design with Nat U 192 
6 Nuclear Test Pu Nuclear Explosive 192 
7 Prepare Pu Subcritical (cold) Testing Facility 4434 
8 Prepare Pu Nuclear Explosive Testing Facility 2202 
9 Design Pu Implosion Weapon (existing design) 1 
10 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
11 Build Reprocessing Facility 2555 
12 Reprocess at facility 165 
13 Cool Fuel 200 
14 Operate HWR 365 
15 Design and build Heavy-Water Production Facility 5110 
16 Construct HW Reactor 4380 
17 Investigate Needs for HW reactor completion 30 
18 Operate Nat Metal Conversion Facility 90 
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Table 13: Continued 
 
Number Transitions Days 
19 Yellowcake converted into UO2 for natural uranium fuel 2 
20 Yellowcake from Gachin converted to UF6 in Esfahan 1 
21 Yellowcake from Ardakan converted into UF6 in Esfahan 1 
22 Produce yellowcake in Gachin mill 3 
23 Mine Gachin  2 
24 Produce yellowcake in Ardakan Production plant 2 
25 Mine Saghand 1 
26 Possess fuel for heavy-water reactor 1 
27 Operate Esfahan Fuel Fabrication Facility  180 
28 Investigate Fuel Fabrication Facilities and options 1 
 
 
5.9 Plutonium Implosion-Type Weaponization Produced with Illicit Plutonium 
Metal Purchase 
 
There are no material pathways necessary for a plutonium implosion-type weapon 
built with acquired plutonium metal.  The facility pathways involve the hot and cold 
testing of implosion weapon designs, purchase of the plutonium metal, and delivery 
systems.  The times used for hot and cold tests and test preparation are derived from the 
historical example of the Pakistani nuclear program.[7, 41]  The transitions times used for 
the entire proliferation pathway can be seen in Table 14.   
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Table 14: List of Transition Times Used for the Plutonium Implosion-Type Weapon 
Constructed with Illicitly Purchased Plutonium Proliferation Pathway with the 
JCPOA in Force.  The days listed are the transition times used as reference times 
for each task.  The testing of delivery systems and the production of untested 
weapons designs is 1 day in this case because they are known.  The time required to 
construct testing facilities and to conduct weapons testing are taken from the 
Pakistani historic model. 
 
Number Transitions Days 
1 Purchas Pu Metal internationally 365 
2 Retrofit for nuclear payload 60 
3 Test Delivery/Missile Systems (existing 
technology) 
1 
4 Possess Deliverable Pu Weapon 1 
5 Produce Pu Imp Explosive 180 
6 Subcritical (cold) Test Pu Design with Nat 
U 
192 
7 Nuclear Test Pu Nuclear Explosive 192 
8 Prepare Pu Subcritical (cold) Testing 
Facility 
4434 
9 Prepare Pu Nuclear Explosive Testing 
Facility 
2202 
10 Design Pu Implosion Weapon (existing 
design) 
1 
11 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
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6.     ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
The file which is the output of the Nuclear Weapons Latency Computational Tool 
lists the times for each path that has been determined by the simulation.  These times 
include the mean, or expected value, the mean standard deviation, minimum, and the 
mode.[7, 8] These times are listed in Tables 15 and 16. 
 
Table 15: Proliferation Times for Models Simulating Conditions before the 
Enactment of the JCPOA. 
 
Simulation 
Mean Time 
(days) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
(days) 
Mode 
(days) 
Gun-Type Weaponization 255 32.24 172 251 
HEU Hot Tested Implosion-
Type Simulation 
2,541 624.34 1,335 3,059 
HEU Cold Tested Implosion-
Type Simulation 
2,557 630.15 1,390 1,541 
Pu Hot Tested Implosion-Type 
Simulation / Reprocessing 
3,243 514.12 2,078 2,621 
Pu Cold Tested Implosion-Type 
Simulation / Reprocessing 
3,257 538.76 2,519 5,720 
Pu Hot Tested Implosion-Type 
Simulation/ Pu Metal Purchase 
2,573 614.97 1,336 2,596 
Pu Cold Tested Implosion-Type 
Simulation / Pu Metal Purchase 
2,517 629.81 1,408 1,817 
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 The results of the simulations which reflect the Nuclear Weapons Latency of Iran 
before the JCPOA was enacted are listed in Table 15.  The gun-type weapon is the most 
technological simple and requires the least testing and facility improvements, so it is 
expected that this nuclear weapons latency time would be the least.  Additionally, the large 
stockpile of LEU enriched SNM can be expeditiously enriched further to WGU for use in 
this gun-type weapon.  The HEU implosion weapon has a nuclear weapons latency time 
of near 10 times that of the gun-type weapon, 2,541 days for hot tested and 2,557 for cold 
tested, which was anticipated because of the testing facilities which must be built and the 
testing that must be conducted, however, the time modeled for the hot test was expected 
to be higher than that of the cold test.  The plutonium implosion weapon which is 
manufactured utilizing reprocessing results in a latency period of 3,243 days for a hot test, 
and 3,257 days for a cold tested weapon.  This pathway requires the same specialized 
testing facilities as the HEU implosion weapon, the large increase in the latency time in 
this case is due to the construction of the reprocessing facilities, the fuel fabrication for 
the HWR, the completion of the Arak HWRR, the irradiation time, and the cooling time 
of the fuel before reprocessing. I expected to see a wider discrepancy between the nuclear 
weapons latency of the hot vs. the cold test and a greater latency time for the hot tested 
weapon.  The pathway that simulated the illicit purchase of plutonium metal results in a 
nuclear weapons latency of 2,573 for a hot tested weapon and 2,517 for one which is cold 
tested.  This pathway does not vary before or after the JCPOA and does not show the large 
drop in latency that might have been predicted because of the testing facilities that must 
be constructed and the testing that must be undertaken to produce an implosion-type 
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weapon.  The results of these simulations are generally as expected and gave a good basis 
for comparison to the latency times after the JCPOA comes into effect.   
 
 
Table 16: Proliferation Times for Models Simulating Conditions after the 
Enactment of the JCPOA. 
 
Simulation 
Mean 
Time 
(days) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
(days) 
Mode 
(days) 
Gun-Type 
Weaponization With No 
Additional Facilities 
1,346 247.49 897 1,123 
Gun-Type 
Weaponization With an 
Additional Enrichment 
Facility 
542 70.52 362 493 
Gun-Type 
Weaponization With 
New AVLIS Facility 
2,140 533.38 1,168 1,716 
Gun-Type 
Weaponization With 
Existing AVLIS Facility 
363 48.68 237 376 
Gun-Type 
Weaponization With 
Illicit Purchase of 5000 
kg of UF6 Enriched to 
3.5% 
555 105.14 338 648 
Gun-Type 
Weaponization With 
Illicit Purchase of 200 
kg of UF6 Enriched to 
20% 
331 46.05 215 349 
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Table 16: Continued 
 
Simulation 
Mean 
Time 
(days) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
(days) 
Mode 
(days) 
HEU Hot Tested 
Implosion-Type 
Simulation 
2,870 420.36 1,710 2,821 
HEU Cold Tested 
Implosion-Type 
Simulation 
2,878 441.52 1,787 2,496 
Pu Hot Tested 
Implosion-Type 
Simulation / 
Reprocessing 
4,711 1180.96 2,575 3,117 
Pu Cold Tested 
Implosion-Type 
Simulation / 
Reprocessing 
4,633 1132.08 2,488 6,523 
Pu Hot Tested 
Implosion-Type 
Simulation/ Pu Metal 
Purchase 
2,573 614.97 1,336 2,596 
Pu Cold Tested 
Implosion-Type 
Simulation / Pu Metal 
Purchase 
2,517 629.81 1,408 1,817 
 
 
The results of the simulations that modeled proliferation pathways after the 
JCPOA is enacted are listed in Table 16.  The nuclear weapon latency of a gun-type 
weapon with no additional facilities was 1,346 days.  This was an expected increase since 
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both the enrichment facilities and the stockpile had been greatly reduced by the JCPOA. 
When an additional enrichment facility with a 14,000 SWU was modeled, the latency 
drops, as expected to closer to the time seen before the JCPOA, however, the impact of 
the reduction of the SNM stockpile keeps the nuclear weapons latency higher.   
The nuclear weapons latency of a model with a new AVLIS facility is high, 2,140 
days.  This is due to the construction time of the facility.  When a path is modeled that 
contains an existing AVLIS facility the nuclear weapons latency dropped to 363 days.  
This is less than the nuclear weapons latency time seen with an additional gaseous 
centrifuge facility because of the reduction in the enrichment times and lack of 
construction times.   
The production of SNM represents the majority of time and energy needed to 
produce a weapon.  The purchase of SNM bypasses this timely path and simulates a 
stockpile of enriched material, because the JCPOA called for such a dramatic reduction of 
Iran’s stockpile this pathway will illustrate the effects of this reduction.  The pathway 
which modeled the illicit purchases of 5,000 kg of UF6 enriched to 3.5% has a nuclear 
weapons latency of 555 days and the illicit purchases of 200 kg of UF6 enriched to 20% 
has a nuclear weapons latency of 331 days.  Since the majority of energy is expended 
during the first stages of enrichment it was expected that the latency would drop as the 
enrichment of the illicitly purchased material rose.   
A HEU implosion-type weapon requires less enriched uranium than a gun-type 
weapon, but the facilities needed for the production and testing of implosion-type weapons 
are specialized and must be constructed.  Therefore, it was expected the nuclear weapons 
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latency for an implosion-type weapon would be longer than for a gun-type weapon.  The 
plutonium weapon requires fuel fabrication, irradiation, and reprocessing prior to any 
testing and was consequently expected to have a higher nuclear weapons latency.   
A determination of the nuclear weapons latency value of the JCPOA for each 
model is seen in Table 17.  The gun-type weapon pathway with only with the facilities 
allowed under the JCPOA shows a latency of 1,346 days.  This time is a 428% increase 
when compared to the to the 255 latency period which was seen in the simulations before 
the JCPOA.  Since the enrichment capabilities were reduced to 17% of their previous size 
and the SNM stockpile reduced, this is the level of increase that was expected.   
When an additional IR-1 enrichment facility, similar in size to Natanz, was added 
to the gun-type weapon pathway the latency dropped to 542 days, which is still more than 
double the latency prior to the JCPOA.  The difference is caused by the loss of the second 
enrichment facility, the use of the IR-2m centrifuges, and the absence of the large stockpile 
of SNM which existed prior to the JCPOA.  The large footprint and energy consumption 
of a facility such as this makes it risky to operate, especially when under Additional 
Protocols; the Natanz Facility was built and operated as a covert facility, but was 
discovered even without the Additional Protocols in place.     
The gun-type pathways that model an LEU AVLIS enrichment facility include a 
path utilizing an existing facility and a path where the facility must be constructed.  The 
path involving the building of this facility has a latency of 2,140 days and the path with 
an existing facility has a latency of 363 days.  The difference here is obviously the design 
and building time of the facility, but these latency times illustrate that an existing AVLIS 
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facility shows a drastically reduced latency, but still greater than the latency prior to the 
JCPOA because of the smaller SNM stockpile.  An AVLIS facility has a small footprint 
and energy signature, which would make it more easily concealed under IAEA inspections 
and Additional Protocols.  These factors make AVLIS an enormous proliferation concern. 
 
Table 17: Nuclear Weapons Latency Value of the JCPOA with Associated 
Uncertainties. 
 
Weapon 
Type 
Mean Time 
Before 
JCPOA 
(days) 
Simulation with 
JCPOA in Force 
Mean Time 
After JCPOA 
(days) 
Value of the 
JPCOA 
(days) 
Uncertainty 
(days) 
Gun-Type 255 ± 32 
No Additional 
Facilities 
 
1,346 ± 247 1092 249 
Additional 
Enrichment Facility 
542 ± 71 287 78 
New AVLIS Facility 
 
2,140 ± 533 1886 534 
Existing AVLIS 
Facility 
 
363 ± 49 109 59 
Illicit Purchase of 
5000 kg of 3.5% 
Enriched UF6 
555 ± 105 301 110 
Illicit Purchase of 200 
kg of UF6 Enriched to 
20% 
331 ± 46 76 56 
HEU 
Implosion-
Type 
2,541 ± 624 
Hot Tested 
 
2,870 ± 420 382 752 
2,557 ± 630 
Cold Tested 
 
2,878 ± 442 322 770 
Pu 
Implosion-
Type 
3,243 ± 1255 
Hot Tested 
Reprocessing 
 
4,711 ± 1241 1468 1765 
3,257 ± 1311 
Cold Tested 
Reprocessing 
4,633 ± 1189 1376 1770 
2,573 ± 615 
Hot Tested Illicit Pu 
Metal Purchase 
2,573 ± 615 - - 
2,517 ± 630 
Cold Tested Illicit Pu 
Metal Purchase 
2,517 ± 630 - - 
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The next two pathways involve the purchase of enriched UF6 to use in the 
production of a gun-type weapon.  The first involves the purchase of 5,000 kg of UF6 
enriched to 3.5% and the weapons latency in this case is 554 days.  The second is the 
purchase of 200 kg of UF6 which is enriched to 20% and the latency is 331 days.  The 
energy needed to enrich uranium from natural to weapons-grade decreases exponentially 
as the enrichment increases.  The enrichment from natural to 3.5% requires approximately 
148 SWU/kg; the enrichment from 3.5% to 20% requires approximately 42 SWU/kg; 
while the enrichment from 20% to 93% requires only approximately 20 SWU/kg.[45]  This 
pathway eliminates the lower enrichment stages, which are also the more time consuming 
and energy greedy stages, resulting in the shortened latency.  The purchase of 20% 
enriched material has a latency which is closest to the latency prior to the JCPOA.  This 
purchase represents an amount that is greater than the SNM stockpile prior to the JCPOA 
and if greater enrichment facilities existed at the time of this purchase the latency might 
be less than before the JCPOA. 
The HEU implosion pathway is less dependent on material production than a gun-
type weapon, because of the reduced demand of WGU, but more reliant on the 
constructing of testing facilities and conducting tests.  Therefore, the pathways show 
relatively the same latency before and after the enactment of the JCPOA.  The slight 
increase seen in the latency as a result of the JCPOA, 2,541 days to 2,870 days for the hot 
test option and 2,557 to 2,878 for the cold test option, are because of the difference in the 
enrichment capability and in the stockpile of SNM. 
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The Pu implosion pathway after the JCPOA requires the construction of a HWR, 
a heavy-water production facility, a reprocessing facility, and the fabrication of fuel.  The 
activities that lengthen this time from before and after the JCPOA include the complete 
construction of a reactor instead of only the completion of Arak HWR, and the 
construction of a heavy-water production facility instead of the time needed to produce 
enough heavy water in an existing facility.  The hot test option shows an increase from 
3,243 days to 4,711 days while the cold test option changes from 3,257 days to 4,633 days.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this work we have calculated our best estimate of the Nuclear Weapons Latency 
for Iran both with and without the JCPOA in force.  Based on these results, we expect that 
the JCPOA will lengthen Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Latency.  This expected value assumes 
application of stringent inspections and the requirements of the Additional Protocols.  The 
establishment of an AVLIS facility and the purchase of 20% enriched UF6 cause the most 
concern in these simulation.  This is as expected, since the reduction of enrichment 
capabilities have been shown to have the most impact, increasing the latency of all types 
of weapons.   
The illicit purchase of 20% enriched UF6 drops the latency to almost pre-JCPOA 
values.  This purchase would dramatically shorten the material pathways and allow the 
Iranians to circumvent the most limiting factors in the agreement and move forward with 
their weapons testing and production.  This purchase would be a short term advance, since 
the repeated acquisition of this material would be unlikely and result in only enough 
material for a single gun-type weapon making the Iranians more of a target than a nuclear 
power.   
A more troubling advancement than the illicit purchase of 20% enriched uranium 
would be in the field of AVLIS.  The acquisition of AVLIS technology by Iran would be 
a significant leap forward in their weapons program, especially considering that the 
facility modeled was a LEU facility.  If Iran were to inaugurate a HEU AVLIS facility, 
the nuclear weapons latency would certainly be greatly lessened.  The AVLIS is, however, 
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a complicated and exacting task which has not been mastered by leading researcher in the 
field.  Since this level of expertise takes time, money, and specialized equipment, the 
chance of success of a covert HEU AVLIS facility is low, and lessened more if inspections 
and import restrictions are continually enforced.  To combat against AVLIS testing the 
level of the SNM stockpile should be closely monitored.  Diversion of this material would 
be necessary to facilitate testing.   
In conclusion, the Iranian path toward a weapon has clearly been hindered by the 
JCPOA, the extent of which depends upon the path taken to a weapon and the amount of 
external assistance utilized.  Iran as a nuclear weapon state would likely result in regional 
instability and could have many consequences, such as an nuclear arms race with Saudi 
Arabia, and military action by either the United States or Israel.  This agreement hopes to 
improve Iran’s regional and international dialogue, ending the sanctions and isolation that 
Iran, and the Iranian people, have suffered under for years.  This opening up of Iran to 
more soft power influences, by the United States and other moderate and progressive 
nations, while hindering the forward progress of the nuclear weapon production could be 
the most lasting and effective outcome of the JCPOA. 
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